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Abstract 
This study aims to examine the impact of some bank characteristics (age, size, profitability and 
leverage) on the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of listed banks in Borsa Istanbul. All 
(13) listed banks represent the sample of the study. The study adopted the deductive approach by 
developing hypotheses based on the relevant theories and results of prior studies. The study also 
applied the panel data strategy to analyze the collected data from annual reports across five years 
(2013-2017). The results indicated that there is a positive relationship between each bank characteristic 
(age, size, profitability and leverage) and the level of voluntary disclosure. The results also show that 
profitability has a big impact on the level of voluntary disclosure followed by leverage, whereas, age and 
size have a small effect. There are a few studies on the extent of voluntary disclosure and its relationship 
with firm characteristics during a number of years (longitudinally) especially in the banking sector of 
developing countries, hence, it is expected that this study will provide evidence to clarify such 
relationship in Turkish banking sector. Therefore, the research in this field is required to confirm or 
disprove the findings of prior studies. 
Keywords: Voluntary Disclosure; Firm Characteristics; Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) Regression 
JEL Classifications: M4; M41 
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Introduction 
As a result of financial scandals and crises, firms have been asked for a higher level of disclosure and 
transparency. Transparency will increase by disclosing more voluntary information in the annual reports. 
Voluntary disclosure refers to the additional information in the annual reports presented by firms that 
exceeding the mandatory disclosure (Hasan & Hosain, 2015). Voluntary disclosure is needed to mitigate the 
conflict of interests between management and shareholders. Through voluntary disclosure, asymmetry and 
opportunistic behaviors will decrease, as well as managers will not be able to hold important information for 
their interest. With the increase of globalization in the world’s financial markets in recent years, voluntary 
disclosure has gotten much attention in the accounting literature. In the related literature, there are several 
theories that attempted to interpret the practices of voluntary disclosure, including agency theory, capital 
need theory, signaling theory and legitimacy theory (Shehata, 2014). 
The agency theory implies that there is a conflict of interests between the principal and agent because 
principals often do not have better information about the firm activities as much as agents have (Kivisto, 
2008). This conflict leads to the information asymmetry problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Lev & Penman 
(1990) reported that the presence of the conflict of interests between the management and shareholders 
denotes to the absence of full disclosure. Barako, Hancock, & Izan (2006) point out that revealing more 
voluntary information decreases the agency costs. Also, managers disclose more information to try 
decreasing users’ uncertainty which reducing the cost of capital, as well as for convincing the external users 
they are running in a perfect way (Watson, Shrives, & Marston, 2002). 
According to capital need theory, firms with growth opportunities seek for external capital to finance their 
activities. In this state, mandatory disclosure is not enough to get capital as cheap as possible (Core, 2001). 
The capital need theory suggests that managers have a stimulus to reveal additional information for 
increasing capital on the best possible terms and lower cost (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). As a result of 
globalization and increasing the competition for capital, it is expected that long-term investors will focus on 
firms with high levels of disclosure to reducing their risks and costs of trading (Schuster & O’connell, 2006). 
Dye (1985) and Verrecchia (1983) indicate that firms who publish further information have a higher demand 
for their securities that leads to low the cost of capita. 
Freedman & Jaggi (2010) indicated that signaling theory presents to firms a strategy for mitigating the 
information asymmetry between management and external stakeholders. This theory suggests that when 
the parties those who have more information signal to others, the information asymmetry problem can be 
reduced (Spence, 1973). Shehata (2014) documents that firms signal particular information to stakeholders 
to illustrate that they are the best in the market for the object of attracting investments and enhancing their 
reputation. 
Suchman (1995) stated that legitimacy theory is deemed as another theoretical interpretation for the 
voluntary disclosure. This theory assumes that there is an expressed or implied social contract between 
existing firms and community (Campbell, 2000). Firms' survival and growth are dependent on their capability 
to divide economic, social, or political services to the groups that give them the power and to achieve 
desirable ends to the community (Shocker & Sethi, 1973). According to this theory, the disclosure is used by 
managers to shape stakeholders' views of the firm's role and responsibility, and to what extent the firm is 
fulfilling those responsibilities (Magness, 2006). Thus, managers are compelled to reveal information that 
would change the view of external users about their firm (Cormier & Gordon, 2001). Since the main source 
of legitimation is the annual reports (Dyball, 1998; O’Donovan, 2002), legitimization occurs through both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures (Shehata, 2014). This theory would signal that voluntary disclosure 
could be used to narrow the legitimacy ‘gap’ between how the firms want to be viewed and how they are 
(Campbell, 2000). Consequently, voluntary disclosure is used by firms to present more information about 
them to the society to legitimize their continued activities.  
Therefore, this study aims to investigate the effects of some of the bank characteristics (age, size, profitability 
and leverage) on the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of listed banks in Borsa Istanbul. Also, 
it aims to discover which bank characteristics have big effect on the level of voluntary disclosure. To achieve 
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that, this study is structured as follows: introduction, literature review, research and Methodology, results and 
discussion, conclusion, and references. 
 
Literature Review 
The voluntary disclosure level differs from one firm to another because of some factors that may influence 
the voluntary disclosure level (Abeywardana & Panditharathna, 2016). Firm characteristics are considered 
one of the important determinants of voluntary disclosure. The commonly firm characteristics that have been 
examined in the relevant literature are age, size, profitability, and leverage. 
According to Owusu-Ansah (1998), the firm age may affect the extent of disclosure. Akhtaruddin (2005) 
supposes that firm age is a critical factor in determining the level of disclosure. Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues 
that older firms are likely to present much more information than younger. Older firms with more experience 
are probably to disclose more information in their annual reports to improve their image and reputation in the 
market (Akhtaruddin, 2005). Most of the results of the empirical study show that there is a positive relationship 
between firm age and voluntary or mandatory disclosure (Abeywardana & Panditharathna, 2016; Elfeky & 
Nasiri, 2017; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Owusu-Ansah, 2005; Sehar, Bilal, & Tufail, 2013). However, 
Hossain & Reaz (2007) and Akhtaruddin (2005) found no significant relationship.  
In the disclosure literature, firm size is deemed as an important explanatory variable in explaining variation 
in the level of disclosure. It is expected that there is a positive association between the firm size and the level 
of disclosure. Big firms are able to incur additional costs for gathering and reporting extra information 
(Hassan, 2014). Firth (1979) argues that large firms tend to be listed on the Stock Exchange and have a 
greater reliance on the financial market for financing that may find it in their benefit to reveal more in their 
annual reports. He also mentions that small firms may feel that extra information about their activities will 
place them at a competitive disadvantage with large firms in their industry. Thus, this may lead them to 
publish less information than larger firms to avert what may happen in competitive harms (Hassan, 2014). 
The results of a number of studies supported this perspective and show a positive association between firm 
size and voluntary disclosure. (Barako, 2007; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Lan, 
Wang, & Zhang, 2013; Uyar, Kilic, & Bayyurt, 2013).  
Agency theory implies that managers of very profitable firms are likely to disclose detailed information to 
obtain personal advantages that keep the continuity of their positions and compensation arrangements 
(Inchausti, 1997). Signaling theory indicates that when the firms have good performance, they will be more 
willing to signal their quality to investors (Watson et al., 2002). Since the high profit is an indicator of 
management success, the management will exploit this success to gain many benefits through voluntary 
disclosure (Elfeky & Nasiri, 2017). The results of prior studies that examined the relationship between 
profitability and the level of voluntary disclosure were mixed. Most of these studies found a positive 
relationship between profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure (Abeywardana & Panditharathna, 
2016; Elfeky & Nasiri, 2017; Raffournier, 1995; Rouf, 2011; Sehar et al., 2013). Whilst, Hossain & Taylor 
(2007), Hossain & Hammami, (2009) and Uyar et al. (2013) found that there is no significant relationship.  
Watson et al. (2002) reported that agency theory would predict a positive relationship between leverage and 
disclosure. He mentions that when a firm borrows, it incurs further agency costs that may be decreased by 
managers through disclosing the relevant information voluntarily in the financial reports. It is believed that 
when the level of debt is high, the level of conflicts of interests among stakeholders (creditors, shareholders, 
and managers) will be high (Hieu & Lan, 2015). Therefore, firms will enhance information transparency 
through voluntary disclosure to gain the trust of creditors (Li & Zhao, 2011). However, the results of prior 
studies that investigated the relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure were not consistent. 
Some studies found a positive  and significant relationship between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure 
(Abeywardana & Panditharathna, 2016; Kolsi, 2012; Lan et al., 2013; Sharma & Davey, 2013; Xiao, Yang, & 
Chow, 2004), whereas a significant negative association between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure was 
found by other studies (Birjandi & Hakemi, 2015; Elfeky & Nasiri, 2017; Sehar et al., 2013). On the other 
hand, the studies were undertaken by Owusu-Ansah (1997), Alves, Rodrigues, & Canadas (2012), Uyar et 
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al., (2013) and Hieu & Lan (2015) found that no significant relationship between firm leverage and voluntary 
disclosure. 
Research and Methodology 
The majority of voluntary disclosure studies have been undertaken in developed countries. A little attention 
has been given to the voluntary disclosure in Turkey, especially in the banking sector. The banking industry 
is considered as one of the most important sectors in most countries. It plays a major role in the growth of 
the economy. Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine the impacts of some bank characteristics 
(age, size, profitability, and leverage) on the voluntary disclosure level in the annual reports of listed banks 
in Borsa Istanbul, as well as to determine which bank characteristics have a big influence on the voluntary 
disclosure level. To attain that, the deductive approach was adopted by developing hypotheses based on the 
relevant theories and results of prior studies. The data was obtained from annual reports of listed banks in 
Borsa Istanbul across five years (2013-2017). Therefore, quantitative research design and longitudinal 
research (panel data) strategy were employed in the current study. In order to collect data, this study used 
the content analysis technique. All listed banks (13 banks) in Borsa Istanbul (BIST BANKS) represent the 
sample of the study until the end of 2017.  
Based on the literature review in the previous section and the evidence and results of prior studies the 
hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H1: The bank age impacts positively on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
H2: The bank size impacts positively on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
H3: The bank profitability impacts positively on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
H4: The bank leverage impacts positively on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Baesd on the research hypotheses, the research framework was constructed to clarify the relationship among 
research variables as displayed in figure 1. 
                                        Independent Variables                    Dependent Variable                                 
 
Figure 1: The Research Framework 
 
The following model is formed to examine the impacts of the bank characteristics on the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of listed banks in Borsa Istanbul, the model is represented in equation (2). 
VDI = β0 + β1 BAGE + β2 BSIZE + β3 BPROF + β4 BLEVE + Є …………(2) 
Where: 
 VDI = Voluntary Disclosure Index; 
 β0 = Intercept; 
 β1 to β4= Coefficient of slope parameters; 
 BAGE = Bank Age; 
 BSIZE = Bank Size; 
 BPROF = Bank Profitability; 
 BLEVE = Bank Leverage; 
Bank Age
Bank Size
Bank Profitability
Bank Leverage
The Level of 
Voluntary Disclosure
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 Є= Error term. 
 
An unweighted voluntary disclosure index is used to measure the level of voluntary disclosure. The disclosure 
index has been widely used as a proxy measurement for measuring the level of both mandatory and voluntary 
information (Urquiza, Navarro, & Trombetta, 2009). A checklist was developed to evaluate the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and assigned a score of (1) if an item is disclosed and (0) if not. The checklist included 
64 voluntary disclosure items classified into six categories according to their nature. The voluntary disclosure 
index score (VDI) for all annual reports of banks was calculated as a ratio of the actual voluntary disclosure 
score (AVD) to the maximum voluntary disclosure score, as shown below in equation (1). 
                          VDI = 
∑ 𝐴𝑉𝐷𝑛𝑖=1
𝑀𝑉𝐷
……………………………..... (1) 
            Where: 
 VDI = Voluntary Disclosure Index, 
 AVD = Actual Voluntary Disclosure score (i = 1 if the item is disclosed; i = 0 if the item is not 
disclosed),   
 MVD = Maximum applicable Voluntary Disclosure score, 
 n = number of items disclosed. 
 
Table 1 displays the detailed definitions and measurements of the independent variables. 
Table1: Measurements of the Independent Variables 
Independent Variable Acronym Measurement Prior Studies Support the 
Measurement 
Bank Age BAGE Natural logarithm of the number 
of years from inception until 
2017. Ln (bank age + 1) 
(Ji, Lu, & Qu, 2017; Khan, 
Muttakin, & Siddiqui, 2013) 
Bank Size BSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (Azutoru, Obinne, & Chinelo, 
2017; Ji et al., 2017) 
Bank Profitability BPROF ROA = Net income /average of 
total assets 
(Azutoru et al., 2017; Ji et al., 
2017) 
Bank Leverage BLEVE Ratio of total debt to total assets. (Ji et al., 2017; Khan et al., 
2013) 
 
Results and Discussion  
Two kinds of univariate analysis were adopted; the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. Also, 
multivariate statistical analyses were applied to analyze the data and to test the research hypotheses. 
The mean of the level of voluntary disclosure index (VDI) of all banks over the study period was about 77%. 
The mean of the natural logarithm of bank age (BAGE) of all banks until the end of 2017 was 4.010 (55 
years); the minimum age was 3.260 (26 years) and the maximum was 4.530 (93 years). With respect to 
bank size (BSIZE), the average of the natural logarithm of total assets was 24.902 (65,333,450,443 TL) the 
minimum was 21.99 (3,549,242,000 TL) and the maximum was 26.62 (363,847,259,000 TL). The descriptive 
statistics for the dependent variable and all independent variables are displayed in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
VDI 0.766 0.09095 0.40 0.86 
BAGE* 4.01 0.3950 3.260 4.530 
BSIZE** 24.90 1.40798 21.99 26.62 
BPROF 0.013 0.00556 -0.003 0.028 
BLEVE 0.89 0.02345 0.83 0.93 
                * Natural logarithm of bank age. 
               ** Natural logarithm of total assets. 
From Table 3, it can be observed that there is a slight increase in the average of VDI during the study period. 
The trends of the averages of the dependent and independent variables for all banks during the five-year 
period from 2013 to 2017 are shown in Table 3.   
Table 3: Trends of the Averages of the Research Variables during the Five-year Period. 
Variable 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
VDI 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.78 
BAGE* 3.97 3.99 4.01 4.03 4.05 
BSIZE** 24.56 24.70 24.91 25.06 25.28 
BPROF 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.014 
BLEVE 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 
   * Natural logarithm of bank age. 
   ** Natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Correlation analysis is used to detect any relationship between voluntary disclosure and each characteristic 
of the banks. Dancey & Reidy (2017) recommended that before implementing the multiple regression 
analysis, it is important to perform a correlation matrix. This study applied the Pearson correlation (parametric 
test) and the Spearman's Rank correlation (non-parametric test). Spearman correlation is applied to avoid 
the probability of existing the non-normality problem in some variables. 
The results of the Pearson correlation displayed in Table 4 show that voluntary disclosure (VDI) is significantly 
and positively associated with all of the bank characteristics at a confidence level of 95%. The results also 
show that there are no high correlation coefficients between the independent variables. All correlation 
coefficients are less than (0.7) the minimum correlation proportion acceptable suggested by Tabachnick & 
Fidell (2013). 
Table 4: Pearson Correlation Analysis. 
 VDI BAGE BSIZE BPROF BLEVE 
VDI 1     
BAGE 0.6873* 1    
BSIZE 0.7845* 0.6378* 1   
BPROF 0.4955* 0.4146* 0.3063* 1  
BLEVE 0.2666* -0.0285 0.2985* -0.3773* 1 
                * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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The results of the Spearman correlation support the results of the Pearson correlation, excepting the result 
of Bank Leverage (BLEVE). Spearman correlation results show no significant correlation between VDI and 
BLEVE as illustrated in Table 5. In consistent with the Pearson correlation, Spearman correlation results also 
show that the high correlation coefficients between independent variables do not exist. 
Table 5: Spearman Correlation Analysis 
 VDI BAGE BSIZE BPROF BLEVE 
VDI 1     
BAGE 0.6873* 1    
BSIZE 0.7845* 0.6378* 1   
BPROF 0.4955* 0.4146* 0.3063* 1  
BLEVE 0.2666* -0.0285 0.2985* -0.3773* 1 
                * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
The multivariate analysis is used to examine the influences of a collection of independent variables on one 
dependent variable. In this paper, multiple regression analysis was applied to investigate the impacts of bank 
characteristics on voluntary disclosure level. The first step before performing the multiple regression analysis 
is testing the regression assumptions. Aljandali & Tatahi (2018) identify four assumptions must be checked 
before running the regression model; the Normality of the Residuals, Multicollinearity, Homoskedasticity, and 
Autocorrelation. These assumptions were tested using STATA 15.1 software. 
The result of the Shapiro-Wilk test illustrated in Table 6 shows that the P-values is greater than 0.05, as well 
as it can be observed that from the histogram in Figure 2 the model residuals seem to be normally distributed. 
 
Table 6: The Shapiro-Wilk Test for Normality. 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
Residuals 65 0.96455 2.055 1.56 0.0594 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of the Residuals 
 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was applied to test multicollinearity. The rule is if the VIF of a variable is 
greater than 10, meaning that the variable is considered to be highly collinear (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; 
Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). As shown in Table 7 all the VIF values are very small compared to 10 including 
the mean of VIF. Therefore, the multicollinearity problem does not exist in the gathered data. These results 
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are consistent with the correlation results that indicate there are no high correlation coefficients between the 
independent variables. 
Table 7: The VIF Results of the Independent Variables. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
BSIZE 2.19 0.456963 
BAGE 1.91 0.523501 
BPROF 1.55 0.643926 
BLEVE 1.54 0.647756 
Mean VIF 1.8  
 
Homoskedasticity or constant variance refers to the extent to which data values of the variables have equal 
variances. The failure of homoskedasticity is called heteroskedasticity which refers to the variables have non-
constant variance (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). To test heteroskedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test is 
used. This test is reliable, especially if the assumption of normality is met (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The null 
hypothesis is that the variance of the residuals is homogenous. The results of the Breusch-Pagan test shown 
in Table 8 indicated that the P-value was (0.0000), meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Table 8: Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity. 
H0: Constant variance 
chi2(4) 94.56 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Also, the same results are found by applying White's test as shown in Table 9, which means that the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the variances are not constant and the heteroskedasticity problem exists. 
 
Table 9: White's Test for Heteroskedasticity. 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 53.82 14 0.0000 
Skewness 8.89 4 0.0640 
Kurtosis 1.93 1 0.1647 
Total 64.64 19 0.0000 
 
For testing the autocorrelation, Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (first-order-autocorrelation) 
was used. The null hypothesis is that no serial correlation. From Table 10, it is observed that the P-value = 
(0.1606) implying that we failed to reject the null hypothesis and there is no autocorrelation among the 
observations. 
Table 10: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data. 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(1, 12) 2.237 
Prob > F 0.1606 
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The results of testing the assumptions of linear regression show that the residuals seem to be normally 
distributed and the problems of multicollinearity and serial correlation do not exist. In contrast, the results 
indicate that the heteroskedasticity problem exists. It is agreed that when the heteroskedasticity exists, the 
OLS regression model becomes biased and fails to be the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) and thus 
the results would be unreliable and misleading (Bentes & Menezes, 2013; Ghasempour & MdYusof, 2014; 
Gourieroux & Monfort, 1997; Gujarati & Porter, 2009; O’Hara & Parmeter, 2013). When the problem of 
heteroskedasticity exists, the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) can be used as an alternative regression 
model (Aljandali & Tatahi, 2018; Boslaugh & Watters, 2008; Gourieroux & Monfort, 1997). It is, therefore, 
capable to provide the BLUE (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; O’Hara & Parmeter, 2013). To evade the inefficiency 
that occurs by heteroskedasticity, Cameron & Trivedi (2009) and Westerlund & Narayan (2012) 
recommended applying Feasible Generalized Least Squares model (FGLS). In the existence of 
heteroskedasticity, the FGLS works better than OLS (Bentes & Menezes, 2013) and provides efficient 
estimators (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009; Miller & Startz, 2018). Accordingly, we used the FGLS longitudinal 
panel regression as shown in Table 11. 
Table 11: The Results of FGLS Regression for Panel Data. 
VDI Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.  Interval] 
BAGE 0.066492 0.018865 3.52 0.000 0.029517 0.103467 
BSIZE 0.025970 0.005667 4.58 0.000 0.014864 0.037077 
BPROF 5.931854 1.208452 4.91 0.000 3.563331 8.300377 
BLEVE 1.131374 0.285743 3.96 0.000 0.571328 1.691421 
_cons -1.231174 0.229370 -5.37 0.000 -1.680732 -0.781617 
 
The results of the FGLS regression model show that the Wald chi2 (4) = (219.40) and the log likelihood = 
(112.0729), as well as, the P-value of the whole model is highly significant with the value of (0.0000). The p-
value for each explanatory variable tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero (no effect). 
A low p-value (< 0.05) implies that the slope is not zero, which meaning the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
In turn, this indicates that changes in the independent variables are associated with changes in the dependent 
variable. The findings in the Table 11 indicated that all bank characteristics examined (age, size, profitability, 
and leverage) affect positively and significantly on the level of voluntary disclosure. The P-value of each bank 
characteristic is highly significant with a very small value of (0.000). These results are consistent with the 
results of the correlation analyses illustrated above. Therefore, all research hypotheses are accepted. Bank 
age, bank size, bank profitability and bank leverage impact positively on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
The results of the FGLS regression show that profitability has the biggest effect on the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of the listed banks in Borsa Istanbul. The coefficient indicates that for every 
additional percentage point in profitability, the level of voluntary disclosure expects to increase by an average 
of 5.93 percentage points. The results also show that the second biggest effect on the level of voluntary 
disclosure achieved by leverage; where its coefficient was 1.31. In contrast, the age and the size have a 
small influence on the level of voluntary disclosure with coefficients of about 0.07 and 0.03 respectively. 
Conclusion 
Most studies on voluntary disclosure have been undertaken in developed countries. Voluntary disclosure in 
Turkey has given a little interest, especially in the banking sector. Turkey is considered an important 
developing country and its banking sector plays a vital role to contribute to developing its economy. Thus, 
this study aims to measure the impact of firm characteristics (age, size, profitability and leverage) on the level 
of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of listed banks in Borsa Istanbul during the period from 2013 to 
2017. 
The results of the Pearson correlation show that voluntary disclosure is significantly and positively associated 
with all of the bank characteristics at a confidence level of 95%. Also, the results of the Spearman correlation 
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support the results of the Pearson correlation, excepting the result of bank leverage. The FGLS regression 
was applied for panel data to avoid the effect of the heteroskedasticity problem. The FGLS results indicate 
that all bank characteristics impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. The results also show that profitability 
has a large influence on the level of voluntary disclosure followed by leverage, whilst age and size have a 
little effect. 
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